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Abstract 
Using survey data from the community, producer marketing groups (PMGs) and farm 
households in Kenya, this paper investigates the potential of rural institutions (farmer 
organizations, their rules and enforcement mechanisms) for remedying pervasive market 
imperfections and facilitate access to new technology in rural areas. Qualitative and 
quantitative analyses show that while the functioning of markets is constrained by high 
transaction costs and coordination failures, PMGs present new opportunities for small 
producers through vertical and horizontal coordination of production and grain marketing. 
They pay 20 to 25% higher prices than other buyers and facilitate the adoption of improved 
varieties that help increase marketable surplus. Their accumulated assets and traded 
volumes are influenced by participatory decision making, member contributions and initial 
start-up capital. While participation declines with farm size, the associated benefits depend 
on marketed amounts. Moreover, the time lag to payment for deliveries makes PMGs less 
attractive marketing channels for the poor. The success of such groups requires policy 
support, increased capital access, rural finance and market information.  
Keywords: Market imperfections; Transaction costs; Institutions; Collective action; 
Producer marketing groups; Kenya 
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Grâce à l’utilisation des données du sondage de la communauté, les groupes de 
commercialisation des producteurs (PMGs en anglais) et les exploitations agricoles au 
Kenya, cet article étudie la capacité des institutions rurales (organisations des fermiers, 
leurs règles et les mécanismes de renforcement) à remédier aux imperfections 
omniprésentes du marché et à faciliter l’accès aux nouvelles technologies dans les zones 
rurales. Alors que le fonctionnement des marchés se trouve gêné par les coûts élevés des 
transactions et les défaillances en matière de coordination, les analyses quantitatives et 
qualitatives montrent que les PMGs offrent de nouvelles possibilités aux petits producteurs 
grâce à la coordination verticale et horizontale de la production et de la commercialisation 
des céréales. Ils paient de 20 à 30% de plus que les autres acheteurs et facilitent l’adoption 
de variétés améliorées qui permet d’augmenter un surplus commercialisable. Leurs biens 
accumulés et les volumes échangés sont influencés par la prise de décisions participative, 
les contributions des membres et le capital de départ. Alors que la participation baisse 
selon la taille de la ferme, les bénéfices associés dépendent des sommes commercialisées. 
De plus, les délais de paiement des livraisons font des PMGs des canaux de distribution 
moins intéressants pour les pauvres. Le succès de tels groupes exige un soutien en matière 
de politique, un accès au capital facilité, une finance rurale et une information sur le 
marché.  
Mots clés : Imperfections du marché ; Coûts de transaction ; Institutions ; Action 
collective ; groupes de commercialisation des producteurs ; Kenya 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite economic liberalization and the implementation of poverty reduction strategies 
aimed at opening up new market-led opportunities for economic growth, the results in 
many sub-Saharan countries have been mixed (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2002; Fafchamps, 
2004). A large proportion of smallholders still engage in subsistence agriculture and are 
thus unable to benefit from liberalized markets. Poor infrastructure (e.g. Dorward et al., 
2005) and lack of market institutions (World Bank, 2002) are common in the subsector, 
leading to high transaction costs, coordination failure and pervasive market imperfections. 
Moreover, systemic partial policy implementation and reversals seem to have muted the 
positive effects of liberalization (Jayne et al., 2002). Nevertheless, there are avenues that 
make use of collective action to complement the government and the private sector for 
enhanced coordination in rural commodity markets. This is especially true in semi-arid 
areas where investments in infrastructure are small and distances to markets are large. 
Under these conditions, private investment and agro-enterprise development are less 
favorable even when the agricultural potential is high.  
We argue that farmer organizations can form the basis for enhancing market access and 
entrepreneurial skills through collective action and that successful collective action in 
marketing requires better coordination of various activities for delivering desirable high 
quality and standardized products. Moreover, new forms of organization for spatially 
dispersed smallholders involve transaction costs, and require good leadership and new 
skills. The negative experiences of cooperatives in the past attest to the importance of these 
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factors in the management and resilience of farmer organizations (World Bank, 2002; Kydd 
& Dorward, 2004). Despite the increased interest in new forms of farmer organization and 
market institutions (Dorward et al., 2005; Poulton et al., 2006), there is insufficient 
empirical evidence on alternative forms of collective action, participation determinants, the 
effectiveness of marketing groups, and how complementary institutions and policy support 
can enhance the role of collective marketing groups. 
This paper analyzes the role of institutional and organizational innovations in improving the 
performance of rural markets in less-favored areas. Following Pender and Hazell (2000), 
we define less-favored areas as those with relatively low potential and often neglected in 
terms of rural infrastructure and also those with good agricultural potential but limited 
access to markets. Using a case study of producer marketing groups (PMGs) in semi-arid 
Eastern Kenya, the paper identifies the potential and limitations of rural institutions in 
providing market services for small-scale producers of dryland crops. It investigates the 
effect of farmer marketing groups on producer prices and the uptake of improved 
technologies, evaluates the institutional and organizational factors that affect the 
performance of these groups, and discusses how collective action and policy issues affect 
capital constraints and the growth and development of these groups. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews market institutions and their 
emerging roles in remedying market imperfections in rural areas, Section 3 outlines the data 
and methods used in the case study, Section 4 presents the main results, and the concluding 
section summarizes the key findings and discusses policy implications.  
 
2. Role of institutions in imperfect rural markets  
According to North (1990), institutions constitute formal constraints (i.e. rules, laws, 
constitutions) and informal constraints (i.e. norms of behavior, conventions, and self-
imposed codes of conduct) that structure human interactions, and their enforcement 
characteristics. The World Bank (2002) states that institutions are the rules, including 
behavioral norms, by which agents interact, and organizations that implement rules and 
codes of conduct to achieve desired outcomes. This suggests that institutions provide 
multiple functions to markets: they transmit information, mediate transactions, facilitate the 
transfer and enforcement of property rights and contracts, and manage the degree of 
competition, thus providing alternative mechanisms through which market failures in rural 
areas can be remedied.  
Market failures arise out of asymmetric information, high transaction costs and imperfectly 
specified property rights. They are more pronounced in areas with underdeveloped road and 
communication networks and other market infrastructure, which is typical of many semi-
arid regions in sub-Saharan Africa. Without supporting market institutions, markets in such 
areas tend to be thin and imperfect, with high marketing and transaction costs. The high 
costs undermine the exchange process and give rise to atomized rural markets with little 
rural-urban linkage (Kranton, 1996). Under these circumstances, households tend to 
withdraw from markets and focus predominantly on subsistence production when food 
Afjare  Vol 3 No 1 March 2009                                      Bekele Shiferaw, Gideon Obare, Geoffrey Muricho and Said Silim 
 
4 
security using markets is not assured (de Janvry et al., 1991). Furthermore, without 
complementary investments along the value chain, important market players fail to 
undertake profitable investments, which leads to coordination failure and encumbers 
market performance (Dorward et al., 2005; Poulton et al., 2006). Moreover, production and 
market risks also exacerbate market imperfections and transaction failures (Kydd & 
Dorward, 2004). Institutional innovations that reduce transaction costs and enhance market 
coordination (e.g. marketing groups that make use of collective action, such as the PMGs 
observed in this study) would be instrumental in overcoming these problems.  
Farmer organizations have the potential to mitigate the effects of imperfect markets by 
enabling contractual links to input and output markets and by promoting economic 
coordination in liberalized markets, hence leveraging market functions for smallholder 
farmers. Realizing this potential will, however, depend on the ability to convey market 
information, coordinate production and marketing functions, define and enforce property 
rights and contracts and, more critically, mobilize producers to participate in markets and 
enhance the competitiveness of agro-enterprises.  
Efforts that promote PMGs with supportive innovative mechanisms for market functions 
will need to account for the challenges of a new generation of cooperatives emerging as 
business oriented enterprises. This is because farmer cooperatives in Africa have had a 
legacy of not being exemplary in providing business opportunities and marketing services 
to small producers (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997). The lessons learned from this indicate that 
farmer organizations can succeed if farmers are allowed and encouraged to manage these 
groups with minimal government interference, and if collective action reduces transaction 
costs and improves competitiveness (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997). This means that a new set of 
policies and institutional reforms are needed to help transform farmer groups into private 
sector enterprises with clear business plans to support and facilitate the commercialization 
of smallholder production through better market access and integration. Activating 
collective action would therefore be critical in realizing this goal. Collective action is likely 
to happen if the gains in terms of reduced transaction costs, better input and/or product 
prices, empowerment and capacity enhancement outweigh the costs of complying with 
collective rules and norms. We investigate these possibilities further. 
 
3. Data and methods 
The study uses two sets of data that were collected in 2003 (baseline) and 2005 (follow-up 
survey) by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) 
in the Mbeere and Makueni districts of semi-arid Eastern Kenya, where market 
infrastructure is underdeveloped and frequent droughts reduce agricultural productivity and 
pose threats to rural livelihoods. These districts were targeted as areas where dryland 
legumes such as pigeonpea and chickpea could be exploited to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability.  
As part of a research project aimed at piloting alternative institutional innovations for 
improving market access for smallholders, 400 households (240 in Mbeere and 160 in 
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Makueni) in target villages were randomly sampled in 2003 before the PMGs were 
established. As part of the project activities, farmers were sensitized to form PMGs through 
voluntary participation.1 Interested farmers came together and established ten PMGs. These 
were formed by building on existing local networks that had various functions. The groups 
agreed on the PMG constitution and elected the leadership. They were then formally 
registered as welfare societies as per Kenyan law. Some households that had at first 
expressed interest in joining the groups did not. From an initial sample of 400 households, 
the distribution of members and non-members was decided on the basis of commitment to 
and paid-up fees for PMG membership. The average number of active PMG members 
varied from 93 in Makueni to 117 in Mbeere, while the average joining fee and annual 
subscription fees were about Ksh64 and 266 per member, respectively.2 Information about 
poverty indicators, agricultural production, market participation and adoption of 
agricultural technologies was elicited from the respondents. 
In the 2005 survey, data were collected both at PMG and household levels. At PMG level 
about five to seven randomly selected key informants consisting of PMG management and 
ordinary members provided information about the marketing activities (including 
constraints), governance and internal dynamics in an open discussion forums. Additional 
information included the group’s objectives and aspirations, characteristics, asset 
ownership and credit access. At the household level, data were collected from 400 
households (210 from Mbeere and 190 from Makueni districts) in the ten PMG villages. 
The respondents comprised 250 members and 150 non-members and included 150 
households re-sampled from the 235 baseline PMG members and 100 households from 165 
non-PMG members. Information about socioeconomic characteristics, assets, credit and 
savings, production, buying and selling, and participation in other networks and in 
collective marketing was obtained from the respondents.  
PMG data were used to determine constraints to collective marketing, identify indicators of 
collective action, and assess the performance of marketing groups in grain marketing. 
Household data were used to quantitatively determine the marketable surplus and to 
understand the structure and performance of rural markets for different crops. To determine 
whether the resource-poor are excluded from PMGs, we used a bivariate Probit model to 
analyze the effect of household assets and wealth indicators on PMG membership. The 
bivariate specification was chosen because many farmers belonged to multiple groups or 
networks besides PMGs,3 meaning that the decision to participate is likely to be jointly 
determined if the group cross-equation errors are contemporaneously correlated. Further, 
we used a price determination model to identify factors that influence grain prices in point 
transactions and to test whether PMGs prices are significantly higher than those of 
competitors after controlling for grain quality, seasonality and distance. We also used a 
                                                 
1
 Project assistance included farmer mobilization to discuss legume production and marketing strategies and 
training in quality seed production, marketing and group organization strategies. No direct subsidies or 
incentives were provided.  
2
 In 2005 the exchange rate was on average US$1 = Ksh 76. 
3
 About 11% of the non-PMG and 20% of the PMG members belonged to agricultural production networks 
(APNs). The APNs are informal groups dealing with village production of crops and handicraft and some 
saving and marketing activities. They facilitate exchange of information and sharing of family labor during 
peak farming seasons.  
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Probit model to test whether PMG membership facilitated the uptake of improved varieties. 
Since the group membership variable is endogenous, we instrumented it using its predicted 
values from the bivariate Probit model. The descriptive statistics for selected variables are 
given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of selected model variables 
Variable Members 
(N=250) 
Non-members 
(N=150) 
Total (N=400) 
Distance to collection centre (km) 1.60 (1.12) 1.80 (1.25) 1.68 (1.18) 
Distance to nearest main market (km)  6.97 (5.23) 6.95 (6.05) 6.97 (5.54) 
 Gender of household head (male=1) 0.8 (0.40) 0.78 (0.42) 0.80 (0.41) 
Education of household head (years) 6.54 (3.80) 6.39 (4.14) 6.48 (3.92) 
Male workforcea  1.45 (1.10) 1.16 (0.89) 1.34 (1.04) 
Female workforcea 1.54 (1.01) 1.24 (0.77) 1.43 (0.94) 
Dependency ratiob 1.93 (1.80) 2.07 (1.83) 1.98 (1.81) 
Household owns ICT (TV, radio or telephone) 
(yes=1) 
0.80 (0.40) 0.84 (0.37) 0.82 (0.39) 
Household located in an average rainfall area 
(yes=1) 
0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 
Household located in a low rainfall area 
(yes=1) 
0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.33 (0.50) 
Membership in agricultural production 
networks (APNs) (yes=1) 
0.20 (0.40) 0.11 (0.31) 0.17 (0.37) 
Adopted improved pigeonpea (yes=1) 0.40 (0.49) 0.27 (0.45) 0.35 (0.48) 
Adopted improved greengram (yes=1) 0.28 (0.45) 0.24 (0.43) 0.27 (0.44) 
Per capita livestock assets (1000 Ksh) 3.88 (4.24) 3.87 (5.35) 3.87 (4.68) 
Per capita physical assets (1000 Ksh) 1.65 (5.43) 3.72 (22.28) 2.43 (14.31) 
Per capita farm size (acres) 1.28 (1.51) 1.42 (1.72) 1.33 (1.59) 
Per capita oxen numbers 0.19 (0.25) 0.21 (0.29) 0.20 (0.27) 
Per capita family education (years) 5.97 (2.00) 5.26 (2.21) 5.71 (2.10) 
Farming as main occupation (yes=1) 0.76 (0.43) 0.69 (0.47) 0.73 (0.45) 
No contact with NGOs (yes=1) 0.16 (0.37) 0.23 (0.42) 0.19 (0.39) 
Source: Survey data 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
a Family workforce (adult worker equivalents) = 1.0* (Number of full-time farm workers aged 16–60 years) + 
0.5*( Number of part-time farm workers aged 16–60 years) + 0.25*( Number of full-time farm workers aged 
11–15 years) 
b Dependency ratio = (Family size – Total workforce)/Total workforce 
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4. Results  
4.1 Performance of grain markets 
An analysis of the market structure in terms of transactions by distance and market 
participants during 2005 shows that rural wholesalers accounted for 45% of sales and 49% 
of the volume traded, while brokers/assemblers accounted for 38% of sales and 38% of 
volume (Table 2). Rural assemblers and wholesalers jointly control more than 80% of the 
grain transactions and traded volumes, which demonstrates that these traders are well 
positioned to buy directly from dispersed farmers residing in scattered rural villages. 
Nevertheless, the high search and grain assembly costs mean increased transaction costs 
(Fafchamps & Hill, 2005) and reduced farmers’ share of the consumer price. The nascent 
PMGs accounted for only 4% of the sales and 2% of the volume, while the rest (10–12%) 
was handled by other local buyers.  
Table 2: Total transactions (number of sales) and volumes (tons) in 2004/05 
Total Share (%) Farm gate < 3 km 3–5 km > 5 km Buyer 
Sales Volume    Sales Volume Sales Volume Sales Volume Sales Volume Sales Volume 
Consumer 33 6.5 5 3 21 4.7 6 0.7 3 0.5 3 0.7 
PMG 27 3.7 4 2 4 0.8 10 0.7 12 2.2 1 0.1 
Rural wholesalers 283 101.8 45 49 25 27.5 167 43.3 82 29.9 9 1.0 
Broker/assemblers 237 77.7 38 38 175 60.0 24 5.2 16 2.9 22 9.7 
Urban wholesalers 13 6.4 2 3 1 0.0 3 0.2 3 0.2 6 6.1 
Cotton ginnery 12 4.7 2 2 - - 2 0.4 9 4.1 1 0.2 
School 19 4.9 3 2 - - 2 0.7 10 2.1 7 2.0 
Total 624 205.7 100 100 226 93.0 214 51.1 135 41.9 49 19.7 
Share (%) - - - - 36 45 34 25 22 20 8 10 
Source: Survey data 
Whereas 45% of the traded volume and 36% of the transactions were conducted right at the 
farm gate, about 34% of the transactions (accounting for 25% of the traded volume), were 
conducted within 3 km of the farm gate. Transactions and volumes declined with distance 
as less than 8% of the transactions and 10% of the traded volume were conducted in 
markets more than 5 km away from the farm. This can be attributed to increasing transport 
and transaction costs for the small marketed quantities as distance increases (Fafchamps & 
Hill, 2005). Prices also varied over time – increasing gradually as local supplies declined 
and declining again as local produce reached local markets after harvest – illustrating 
potential business opportunities for PMGs through bulk marketing, and spatial and 
temporal arbitrage.  
4.2 PMG membership  
A critical policy question about farmer organizations is whether resource-poor farmers 
would actually participate and derive benefits from collective action. To explore this 
question, we tested whether the PMGs excluded the resource-poor farmers in favor of 
wealthier households. We used a bivariate Probit model to identify the determinants of 
PMG membership. Model variables included location, infrastructure, household 
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characteristics, human capital, and access to information. Further, farm size, value of 
livestock, interaction between livestock and farm size, value of physical assets, number of 
oxen (all in per capita terms) and ownership of means of transport, were included to capture 
wealth and asset endowment effects. Access to information was captured through 
ownership of ICT (information and communication technology – radio, mobile phones, and 
TV) and contact with NGO extension personnel. In the absence of effective public 
extension services, NGOs play a vital role in the economic development process in semi-
arid areas. Location effects were captured through distance to markets and historical 
rainfall in the PMG villages. The results are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3: Bivariate Probit coefficients for the determinants of PMG and APN 
membership  
Variable PMG  APN 
Distance to village market (km) -0.083(0.061) -0.090(0.070) 
Distance to nearest main market (km) 0.006(0.014) -0.023(0.018) 
Age (years) -0.006(0.006) 0.003(0.007) 
Gender (1=male) 0.182(0.178) -0.111(0.207) 
Family male workforce 0.024(0.082) -0.104(0.091) 
Family female workforce 0.206(0.087)** 0.056(0.103) 
Dependency ratio  0.029(0.044) 0.094(0.047)** 
Household owns ox-cart (1=yes, 0= otherwise) 0.138(0.178)  0.094(0.198)  
Household located in average rainy area (1=yes, 0= otherwise) -0.120(0.200) 0.041(0.219) 
Household located in dry area (1=yes, 0= otherwise) -0.155(0.173) 0.396(0.200)** 
Log of per capita livestock asset (Ksh) 0.842(0.533) -0.507(0.647) 
Log of per capita physical asset (Ksh) 0.916(0.703) -0.346(0.854) 
Log per capita farm size (acres) -2.093(1.162)* -2.408(1.330)* 
Log of per capita livestock* log per capita farm size 0.766(0.376)** 0.866(0.397)** 
Per capita oxen numbers -0.389(0.316) -0.922(0.506)* 
Per capita family education stock 0.097(0.040)** 0.069(0.045) 
Main occupation (farming=1) 0.301(0.171)* 0.217(0.202) 
Household owns ICT (1=yes, 0=otherwise) -0.347(0.190)* -0.102(0.224) 
Average contact with NGOs (1=yes, 0=otherwise)a -0.179(0.164) 0.243(0.203) 
No contact with NGOs (1=yes, 0=otherwise)a -0.351(0.210)* 0.490(0.240)** 
Constant -2.744(1.845) -0.989(2.236) 
athrho 0.229(0.108)**  
Wald χ2[df] [46] 98.20: Prob >χ2 = 0.000  
Log pseudo-likelihood -395.854 
Wald test of =0  χ2 [1] = 4.501: Prob >χ2 =0.034 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; [df] are degrees of freedom 
a Reference group is households with frequent contact with NGOs. 
Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
** and * indicate significant at 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels, respectively. 
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The bivariate model results show that the residuals of the two network membership 
equations are not independent. The residuals correlation parameter  shows that the two 
equations were correlated (P = 0.034), affirming the superiority of the bivariate Probit 
specification.  
Female workforce in the household (P=0.018), ownership of ICT (P=0.067), per capita 
farm size (P=0.072), the asset-livestock interaction term (P=0.042), stock of household 
education (P=0.014), household occupation (P=0.078) and access to information (P=0.095) 
significantly influenced the likelihood of households joining PMGs. Family workforce 
variables have a positive effect, but only female workforce was significant, indicating that 
PMGs are likely to facilitate participation of the female workforce in agricultural markets.  
The most important policy variables for assessing the potential exclusion of the resource-
poor are the household assets. The results show that PMG membership increases with per 
capita livestock wealth but decreases with per capita farmland, indicating an opposing 
marginal effect of these assets. This opposing effect illustrates a livestock wealth-cropland 
trade-off. Ceteris paribus, smaller cropland reduces the marketed surplus but increases the 
gains from collective marketing, which suggests that households with small landholdings 
are more likely to participate in collective marketing. However, participation in APNs 
decreases with larger land and draught animal (oxen) assets, suggesting that large farmers 
are less likely to engage in such informal exchanges. ICT ownership reduces the probability 
of participating in collective marketing, which indicates some degree of substitution 
between market information channels. However, limited contact with extension (proxied 
through frequency of contact with NGOs) reduces the likelihood of PMG membership but 
improves APN membership. Furthermore, education and farm orientation increase the 
likelihood of PMG membership. Combined with better education, NGO sensitization and 
information flow appear to be good instruments for facilitating participation in group 
marketing.  
4.3 Outcomes of collective marketing  
How does collective marketing affect prices received by farmers and the adoption of new 
varieties? We test the hypothesis that participation in PMGs increases farm gate prices and 
enhances technology uptake. 
4.3.1 Effects on producer prices 
Collective action in marketing is aimed at reducing transaction costs and improving 
producer prices. In addition, a reduction in local market volatility and price risks could be 
beneficial to small producers, but this is difficult to measure without time-series data. We 
used cross-sectional grain sales data and estimated a regression model to identify the 
determinants of actual prices received by farmers and whether PMG prices were higher 
than the competitors. Under imperfect rural markets, farmer output prices depend on, 
among other things, where the product is sold, when it is sold, buyer type, access to market 
information, marketing skills and ability to negotiate deals (de Janvry et al., 1991; 
Fafchamps & Hill, 2005). Of the farm household variables, we included distance to the 
selling market, type of buyer, grain type, season, grain quality, gender and human capital 
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(education) in the price model to capture the effect of imperfect markets on the producer 
prices. The gender and education variables were included as proxies to test any differential 
effects of access to market information and marketing skills on prices received by farmers. 
However, these household variables were not significant and hence not included in the final 
estimated model. 
The model was significant (P < 0.001) and explained about 61% of the variation (adjusted 
R2 = 0.612). Distance to the point of transaction, crop type, location (district), selected 
buyer type, and the sale season influence grain prices (Table 4). Prices increase by about 
Ksh 0.2/kg for every 10 km from the farm gate (P < 0.1). Despite this increase, the 
marginal effect for the range of distances covered (less than 10 km) appears unattractive for 
farmers, unless the quantity sold is large enough to exploit economies of scale. 
Table 4: Determinants of grain prices received by farmers in different rural markets 
Variablea Descriptive statistics (mean) Estimated coefficient 
Amount sold (kg) 324.95 
-0.001(-0.99) 
Amount sold squared (1000 kg) 439 0.000(0.16) 
Distance to selling point (km) 4.6 0.023(1.98)** 
Crop dummies:  
 
         Beans 0.06 15.151(15.04)*** 
         Pigeonpea 0.08 11.250(12.1)*** 
         Chickpea 0.03 13.529(9.35)*** 
         Greengram 0.27 12.342(19.65)*** 
         Cowpea 0.03 4.107(3.04)*** 
         Cotton 0.04 7.791(4.81)*** 
         Vegetables 0.04 7.492(5.59)*** 
Quality (1= if fair average quality) 0.92 0.186(0.22) 
District (1= Makueni) 0.16 -2.254(-3.07)*** 
Buyer dummies:  
 
         Consumer 0.05 6.7476.02)*** 
         PMG 0.04 5.950(5.05)*** 
         Rural wholesaler 0.45 
-0.609(-1.19) 
         Urban trader  0.02 0.959(0.51) 
         Cotton ginnery 0.02 1.074(0.52) 
         School buyer 0.03 3.630(2.72)*** 
Season dummies:  
 
         Harvest season 0.71 
-1.448(-1.91)* 
         2 to 3 months after harvest  0.19 
-1.133(-1.29) 
Owns ICT (yes=1) 0.82 0.157(0.26) 
Constant - 14.069(10.41)*** 
N  624 
F(21, 602)  0.60 
Adj R2  45.06 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels, respectively. 
a Reference variables: crop price = maize; quality = above average; district = Mbeere district; buyer = 
broker/assembler; season = 4–5 months after harvest.  
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Prices vary significantly across crops (P < 0.01). Compared to maize (the reference crop) 
the price varies between Ksh 4/kg for cowpea to about Ksh 15/kg for beans. Pigeonpea and 
greengram – two predominant cash crops in the study districts – sell at Ksh 12 above the 
maize price while chickpea fetches about Ksh 14/kg more than maize. Interestingly, grain 
quality does not seem to matter in price determination, which suggests the existence of an 
asymmetric information problem (Akerlof, 1970).  
Consumers, PMGs and schools paid about Ksh 7, 6, and 4, respectively, more than 
brokers/assemblers (P < 0.01), which indicates that PMGs can be attractive marketing 
channels for farmers. The school feeding programs also provide an alternative market outlet 
to smallholders at higher prices (P < 0.01). About 70% of the grain is sold immediately 
after harvest (Season1). This, however, means a loss of about Ksh 1.5/kg compared to 
selling four to five months later (the reference season) (P < 0.051). But gains from longer 
storage seem less attractive as price differentials from delaying sales for two to three 
months after harvest (Season2) were not significantly lower than the reference season. This 
means that PMGs could exploit brief seasonal price differentials through temporal arbitrage 
involving bulking and storage.  
A simulation analysis using the above econometric results shows that PMG prices (net of 
operational costs) are about 22% to 24% higher than those by middlemen (Table 5). 
However, the opportunity cost of this price gain is a delay in payments of about of five 
weeks compared to other buyers who pay on delivery or shortly thereafter.  
 
Table 5: Effects of collective marketing on pigeonpea prices  
Buyer Season Point of sale Price 
(Ksh/kg) 
PMG price 
advantage (%) 
PMG Immediately after 
harvest 
Farm gate 29.81 
Brokers/assemblers   24.04 
24.00 
PMG  5 km 29.93 
Brokers/assemblers   24.16 
23.88 
PMG 4–5 months after 
harvest 
Farm gate 31.16 
Brokers/assemblers   25.39 
22.72 
PMG  5 km 31.29 
Brokers/assemblers   25.52 
22.62 
 
Given that PMGs pay higher prices than competitors, the critical question then is whether 
this incentive is sufficient to induce and sustain collective marketing. A cost-benefit 
analysis of grain marketing using prices offered by brokers and PMGs at the farm gate can 
provide useful insights. Using the 24% farm gate price differentials for selling immediately 
after harvest, Table 6 presents the estimated gains using the PMG channel compared to 
brokers/assemblers. The average cost of membership (i.e. annualized joining fee and annual 
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contributions) and the opportunity cost of deferred payments are included as direct and 
indirect costs of collective action. The simulation results show that the average income gain 
is about Ksh 678 per household, but varies across household groups and depends on the 
marketed quantity. While the income gain per unit sold is constant, farmers with a larger 
marketed surplus obtain higher benefits, ranging from Ksh 152 for the bottom third to 
Ksh 1133 for the upper third of the farm size classes.4 
 
Table 6: Income effects of selling through marketing groups  
Income gain from using groups by 
farm size classb 
Member lost income by not using groups 
by farm size classb  
Value of grain 
sold (Ksh) 
Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total 
Using PMG price 2303 5387 7418 5155 14381 19284 22452 18705 
Using broker 
price 1872 4413 5988 4188 10518 14407 16743 13889 
Difference 431 974 1429 967 3862 4877 5708 4816 
Cost of collective 
actiona 279 290 296 289 314 330 339 328 
Net gain/lost 
income 152 684 1133 678 3548 4547 5369 4488 
a
 The cost of collective action includes the annualized costs of joining fee, annual subscription fee and the 
opportunity cost of delayed payments calculated using the annual interest rate of 4.3% on savings for 
commercial banks in Kenya.  
b The farm size classes represent the lower, medium and upper third of members selling using the PMG and 
non-PMG channels. 
Assuming that the main alternative to the farm gate is using the broker channel, we use the 
amount marketed by the members through this channel to estimate the income loss that they 
sustain by not exploiting the collective marketing provided by PMGs. The average income 
loss by selling to brokers instead of to the PMGs is about Ksh 4,488 per year. This is about 
7.4% of the poverty-line income and it increases further with the amount diverted away 
from the PMG channel.  
4.3.2 Effects on technology adoption 
A key policy question is whether PMGs could also help smallholder farmers access 
improved technology. The PMGs in eastern Kenya have been involved in the production 
and marketing of improved seeds of dryland crops. Selected PMG members are trained in 
quality seed production methods. With support from some NGOs they produce identified 
new varieties and market the seeds to members at affordable prices. Occasionally, non-
members buy the seeds from the PMG outlets but at higher prices. To test the postulation 
                                                 
4
 Higher rates of time preference (i.e. higher opportunity cost of capital) will lower the gains from using the 
groups. For example, the income gains to lower and upper farm size groups decrease to Ksh 132 and 1070, 
respectively, if a higher annual rate of interest (15%) is used to value the cost of a five-week delay in 
payments.  
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that PMGs enhance technology adoption, we used a Probit model with an instrumented 
PMG membership variable, among others. We ran separate regressions for pigeonpea and 
greengram for which a significant share of farmers said they used improved varieties.  
The results show that PMG membership has significant and positive effects on the uptake 
of new pigeonpea and greengram varieties (P<0.001) (Table 7). Adoption of improved 
varieties is significantly higher in the drier zones, which suggests the importance of these 
crops for food and sources of cash. Households with a higher number of dependent family 
members are less likely to adopt the improved varieties, perhaps because of financial stress 
or priority given to staple cereals for food security. Contact with formal extension systems 
does not have any effect on the adoption of pigeonpea varieties but seemed to discourage 
the uptake of greengram. This may be due to the predominant focus of formal extension 
systems on major staples rather than dryland legumes. Nonetheless, NGOs have a 
significant effect on the promotion of improved legume varieties, especially pigeonpea. 
 
Table 7: Probit coefficients for the effect of PMG membership on technology adoption 
Variable Pigeonpea Greengram 
Predicted membership 5.494(1.46)*** 2.690(1.03)*** 
Age of head 0.012(0.01)* 0.002(0.01) 
Head is male -0.255(0.21) 0.305(0.25) 
Male workforce -0.098(0.09) -0.039(0.10) 
Female workforce -0.405(0.14)*** -0.105(0.12) 
Dependency ratio -0.037(0.05) -0.162(0.07)** 
Owns radio, phone or TV 0.303(0.27) 0.553(0.25)** 
Owns ox-drawn cart -0.247(0.19) 0.281(0.21) 
Lives in medium rainfall area 0.673(0.21)***  
Lives in dry area 0.807(0.17)*** -0.167(0.18) 
Log of per capita land 1.316(1.63) 1.287(1.43) 
Log of per capita livestock -0.485(0.20)** -0.163(0.20) 
Log of per capita physical assets 0.277(0.16) -0.119(0.17) 
Log per capital land * log per capita livestock  -0.482(0.49) -0.351(0.44) 
Per capital oxen numbers 0.356(0.49) 1.224(0.40)*** 
Per capita education -0.081(0.06) -0.131(0.06)** 
Farming as main occupation (yes=1) -0.647(0.23)*** -0.104(0.24) 
Average contact with NGO (yes=1) 1.295(0.27)*** 0.122(0.33) 
No contact with NGOs (yes=1) 1.027(0.35)***  
Has extension contact (yes=1) -0.048(0.15) -0.514(0.16)*** 
Predicted error -1.226(1.47) 0.423(1.58) 
Constant -2.687(0.90)*** -1.001(1.04) 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels, respectively. 
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4.4 Performance of collective marketing groups  
In the absence of standardized measures or indicators to assess the level, viability and 
effectiveness (performance) of collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004; McCarthy et 
al., 2004), we used the PMG survey data to identify proxy indicators of performance 
against which we measured PMG marketing outcomes.5 
The PMGs were compared using per capita total assets built over time and total volume of 
grains traded as outcome indicators for effectiveness of collective marketing. The relative 
values for the PMG performance indicators are shown in Table 8. The distribution of these 
indicators across PMGs show that per capita assets were lowest in Nthingini (Ksh 34) and 
highest in Kathonzweni (about Ksh 6393), while the per capita total sales for 2003/2004 
ranged from a low of 3 kg in Thavu to 242 kg in Kathonzweni. When the sales are 
disaggregated by year, it becomes evident that some PMGs did not trade in one year or the 
other while some traded in both years. As consistency in grain marketing is a good 
indicator of performance, the volume of trade is separately ranked for the two years. 
 
Table 8: Performance of marketing groups  
Per capita sales 
volume 
(kg/member)  
Per capita total sales 
volume (kg/member) 
PMG Per capita assets 
built over time 
(Ksh/member) 
2003a 2004 2003-2004 
Mean rank for 
performance 
indicators 
Mean rank for 
collective action 
indicators (not 
shown) 
Kathonzweni 6393 212 30 242 1.3 4.3 
Kalamba 3130 46 8 54 3.3 3.0 
Makima 301 - 123 123 3.5 3.2 
Kilia 177 34 23 57 5.3 6.8 
KMY 333 192 0 192 5.3 6.3 
Wango 63 - 8 8 6.5 4.8 
Emali 268 92 0 92 6.7 6.0 
Thavu 395 3 0 3 6.7 5.2 
KYM 335 10 0 10 6.7 6.5 
Nthingini 34 - 7 7 7.5 5.7 
Source: Survey data 
a Missing data indicates that PMGs were established later in 2003 and did not sell during that year. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 In addition, six indicators of collective action were identified: number of elections since formation, share of 
members respecting bylaws, attendance at meetings, annual member contributions to the group, cash capital 
and agreed annual subscription fees. Due to space limitations, only the aggregate ranks are shown in Table 8. 
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The aggregate rankings across the selected performance indicators (i.e. combining assets 
built over time and crop sales per capita) show that Kathonzweni (1.3), Kalamba (3.3) and 
Makima (3.5) performed much better than others. The mean rankings for the six indicators 
of the degree of collective action (Table 8, last column) indicate that these same groups 
performed best, namely Kalamba (3.0), Makima (3.2), and Kathonzweni (4.3). A 
Spearman’s rank correlation test showed that the average ranks for the level and 
effectiveness of collective action were strongly correlated (r = 0.985). This confirms that 
higher effectiveness in group marketing functions is closely correlated with higher levels of 
collective action, a result consistent with field observations of the level of group action and 
its effectiveness. 
4.5 Policy issues for collective marketing 
If farmer marketing groups offer new opportunities to make markets work for small 
producers, what are the external limiting factors for their growth and expansion? The most 
important constraints to collective marketing were identified as lack of credit, price 
variability and low volumes. Other less important operational constraints include lack of 
buyers and low business skills.  
The prominence of lack of credit as a major constraint is consistent with the pervasive 
financial market imperfections in rural areas (Poulton et al., 1998; Kelly et al., 2003) and 
the wide recognition of the role credit can play in marketing and enterprise development 
(Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002; Bingen et al., 2003). However, mechanisms such as rural 
micro-credit facilities, contract or out-grower schemes and inventory credit arrangements 
may be used to address these constraints. A Grameen bank type of micro-finance scheme 
may be useful but available loans tend to be small and unsuitable for grain marketing 
operations. This suggests that while access to significant capital is needed, selective 
subsidies may also be required to kick-start agricultural markets as they play an important 
role in relieving critical seasonal and cash constraints and reducing market and input supply 
uncertainties (Dorward et al., 2005). 
These findings suggest that, given the low level of market development and lack of service 
providers in many semi-arid rural areas, the PMGs are unlikely to prosper in a ‘business as 
usual’ policy environment. There is a need for supportive policies that spur their growth 
and gradual transition to profitable farmer cooperatives and business enterprises. This 
would include suitable legal status and protection, access to market information, support to 
enhance business skills, and access to essential finance and credit facilities.  
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Although market liberalization is a necessary condition for increasing access to markets by 
smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, it is not sufficient. With imperfect markets and 
limited institutions to support market functions, liberalization strategies were bound to fail 
to integrate smallholders in less-favored areas into markets. In a situation of limited market 
infrastructure and pervasive rural market imperfections in input and output markets, 
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producer organizations and collective marketing groups provide alternative institutional 
mechanisms to enhance the uptake of market-oriented and productivity-enhancing 
technologies, to link farmers to markets, and to foster market participation and the 
commercialization of smallholder production.  
This paper has shown that PMGs were able to pay higher prices to members. They 
facilitated access to improved seed and the adoption of new varieties for dryland crops. 
This finding is important considering the relative lack of policy interest in dryland crops 
and the importance of access to improved technologies and quality seed of high-yielding 
and low-risk varieties as key determinants in generating marketable surplus and helping 
commercialize smallholder agriculture (Barrett, 2008). There was no evidence that the 
PMGs benefited only the wealthier and resource-rich farmers. On the contrary, the 
incentive for joining collective marketing groups seems to be higher for those with smaller 
farmland and facing higher marketing costs.  
It is evident that only the relatively successful PMGs were able to exploit the potential of 
collective marketing to improve markets for smallholders. The key insights for 
understanding the effectiveness of group marketing are related to mobilizing farmers in 
participatory governance, providing start-up capital and finance for grain marketing, and 
training in business skills to manage PMGs as business enterprises. In addition, the PMGs 
need to be supported to transit into legal business entities. The effectiveness of the PMGs 
was hampered by lack of cash capital to pay farmers on time, making it difficult for cash-
starved farmers to wait even when promised prices were high. One strategy to address this 
would be to explore the use of crop inventory as collateral for financial credit and 
encourage formal financial institutions to extend inventory credit services to organized 
farmer groups. Alternatively, farmers would be paid a proportion of their grain value at the 
time of delivery and defer full payments until the grain is sold at higher prices. This would 
allow them to meet immediate cash needs while benefiting from better prices through 
collective marketing. These policy options should be pursued in concert with alternative 
strategies for increasing marketable surplus and smoothing supply through investments in 
extension and seed systems as well as drought-mitigating and water-harvesting techniques 
for effective risk management.  
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